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Abstract Data Integration Systems (DIS) are concerned
with integrating data from multiple data sources to resolve
user queries. Typically, organisations providing data
sources specify security policies that impose stringent
requirements on the collection, processing, and disclosure
of personal and sensitive data. If the security policies were
not correctly enforced by the integration component of
DIS, the data is exposed to data leakage threats, e.g.
unauthorised disclosure or secondary use of the data.
SecureDIS is a framework that helps system designers to
mitigate data leakage threats during the early phases of DIS
development. SecureDIS provides designers with a set of
informal guidelines written in natural language to specify
and enforce security policies that capture confidentiality,
privacy, and trust properties. In this paper, we apply a
formal approach to model a DIS with the SecureDIS
security policies and verify the correctness and consistency
of the model. The model can be used as a basis to perform
security policies analysis or automatically generate a Java
code to enforce those policies within DIS.
Keywords Security policy  Event-B  Formal method 
Privacy  Trust  Confidentiality  RBAC  Trust model 
Access control  Modelling
1 Introduction
With the advent of cloud computing and big data analysis,
Data Integration Systems (DIS) regained popularity. DIS
retrieve data from multiple sources to resolve consumer
queries [19]. The main architecture of a DIS consists of a
mediator [22] that provides an interface between data
consumers and a set of data sources. Data consumers place
queries that are resolved by the mediator by integrating
data from different data sources.
Organisations providing data sources specify the
security policies that impose stringent requirements on the
collection, processing, and disclosure of personal and
sensitive data. Integrating and enforcing these policies is
the responsibility of the mediator during the execution of
a query placed by a data consumer. However, if the
mediator does not correctly enforce the security policies,
this can result in serious data leakage and/or privacy
violations leading to significant legal and financial
consequences.
Data leakage can occur in a DIS by violating the con-
fidentiality of data provided by data sources. For example,
the queries executed by the mediator expose data to con-
sumers that were not allowed to access that data according
to the security policies of the data sources. Moreover, data
leakage can occur by violating the privacy of the data when
a query discloses the data to a consumer that has a purpose
different from the data sources allowed purposes. However,
even when the mediator enforces security policies on the
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consumers and only if the purpose of the query matches the
purpose for which the data has been collected, data leakage
threats can still materialise in a DIS.
In fact, once the data has been disclosed to data con-
sumers, it is possible that the consumer does not process
the data according to the data sources’ security policies.
The consumer may share the data with unauthorised parties
or use the data for fraudulent purposes.
Therefore, to mitigate data leakage threats in DIS, it is
important to enforce security policies that not only specify
who is entitled to access the data and for which purposes,
but also take into account the risks of disclosing this data to
data consumers. The risks of consumers not behaving
according to a security policy are usually quantified by the
degree of trust [23] placed into the consumer.
SecureDIS [4] is a novel framework to design DIS
resilient to data leakage threats. In order to mitigate data
leakage threats, SecureDIS argues that it is very important
to enforce security policies that satisfy Confidentiality,
Privacy, and Trust (CPT) properties. In particular, Secur-
eDIS helps system designers in considering data leakage
threats into the early design phases of DIS by mapping data
leakage threats to the different components of a DIS
architecture [5] and by providing a set of informal guide-
lines, written in natural language, to implement security
policies that mitigate those risks.
In this paper, we provide a formal approach to model
SecureDIS security policies enforced on the execution of a
query. The approach consists of modelling the DIS and the
SecureDIS security policies, and verifying the consistency
and correctness of the model using Event-B formal method
[1] supported by Rodin toolset [2]. The generated model can
help designers to analyse the policies or to automatically
generate a Java code to enforce the policies within DIS.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2
provides an overview on the SecureDIS framework and the
requirements to specify and enforce security policies that
mitigate data leakage threats. Section 3 explains the mod-
elling of the security policies in Event-B. Section 4 dis-
cusses the formal verification of the model. Section 5
reviews the related work, while Section 6 concludes and
discusses future research directions.
2 An Overview of the SecureDIS Framework
SecureDIS [4] is a design framework that assists system
designers in building DIS resilient to data leakage threats.
The framework consists of three main components: (a) a
reference architecture of the DIS; (b) a list of data leakage
threats mapped to DIS architectural components; and (c) a
set of guidelines to mitigate data leakage threats. The
components are described as follows:
(a) The reference architecture it consists of the follow-
ing components, as shown in Fig. 1:
1. Data and data sources is the core component of
the DIS representing the data sources integrated,
through their data items, to answer consumers’
queries.
2. The integration approach is the approach or
method used to integrate the data.
3. The integration location is the location where
the integration process takes place to answer
data consumers’ queries.
4. Security policies combine the security policies
from different data sources. It is enforced by the
integration location during the execution of the
queries.
5. Data consumers represent the client side of the
system, where data consumers request data by
queries and where the results are returned to
consumers.
(b) The data leakage threats SecureDIS considers
different types of data leakage threats, such as
inference attacks, unauthorised access, secondary
use of information, and non-compliance to policies
[5]. Each threat is mapped to one or more of the
architectural components of the DIS to understand
its consequences and the ways to mitigate it. For
example, unauthorised disclosure of sensitive data
within the integration location to an entity either
inside or outside the DIS is caused by the lack of
employing data protection techniques.
(c) The SecureDIS guidelines Each component of the
DIS architecture is associated with a set of data
leakage mitigation guidelines. These guidelines
represent the activities proposed to system designers,
such as the use of security policies, encryption, and
logging. Each guideline covers one or more of the
CPT properties and targets one or more data leakage
threats. For example, SecureDIS suggests logging
and analysing consumers’ queries at the data
consumers component in order to identify possible
secondary use threats.
2.1 SecureDIS Guidelines and Requirements
for Security Policies
In this work, we focus on the SecureDIS guidelines related
to the specification and enforcement of security policies
achieved at the integration location. SecureDIS argues that
in order to mitigate data leakage threats, it is crucial for
security policies to include the following CPT properties:
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Confidentiality is defined as limiting access to autho-
rised entities [17]. Data leakage threats to confidentiality
materialise when the integration location returns data items
to a consumer who was not allowed to access those items
based on the data sources’ security policies. To avoid this
threat is important to implement a Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC) policy and configure it so that each con-
sumer can access only the pieces of data necessary to
answer the query [21].
Privacy is the right of the individual to decide what
information about himself/herself should be communicated
to others and under what circumstances [27]. Data leakage
threats to privacy are caused by: disclosing data for pur-
poses different from the one for which the data has been
collected [13], by revealing Personally Identifiable Infor-
mation (PII) intentionally or unintentionally, or by expos-
ing sensitive information protected by data protection laws
and regulations. Therefore, in order to prevent data leakage
threats to privacy, the security policy should include the
following two dimensions:
– Purpose determines the reasons for data to be collected
or used. The integration location should only grant the
execution of a query if the purpose of the query specified
by the data consumer matches one of the purposes for
which the data items have been collected [13].
– Data sensitivity quantifies who should have access to
data items and how much harm would be done if the
data was disclosed. In order to protect the disclosure of
sensitive data items, a security policy similar to the one
of the Bell–LaPadula mandatory access control model
[12] should be enforced by the data integration
location. The security policy should restrict access to
data items returned by a query based on the sensitivity
of the data items (represented by a label) and the
authorisation (represented by security level) of con-
sumers to access data items of such sensitivity.
Therefore, the integration location should only grant
the execution of a query if the security level assigned to
the data consumer is higher or equal to the sensitivity
label assigned to data items returned by that query.
Trust is defined as the belief that an entity will behave in a
predictable manner by following a security policy [24].
Therefore, trust is used to quantify the risk of data leakage
threats that materialise after the execution of queries is
granted to data consumers. Once the data is disclosed to
data consumers, they could misuse the data by sharing it
with unauthorised parties or use it for purposes other than
the data provider’s intended purposes. Therefore, the
security policy should grant the execution of a query only if
the trust level of the data consumer is equal or higher to the
one specified by the data sources’ security policies.
The guidelines above are transformed into specific sys-
tem requirements shown in Table 1, where the property
column indicates the CPT property covered by the
requirement. These requirements are used to model the
security policies of the DIS.
3 Formal Modelling of Security Policies in
Event-B
This section starts by introducing the Event-B formal
method, followed by the process of modelling SecureDIS
security policies in Event-B.
3.1 Overview of the Event-B Formal Method
Formal methods have been widely used to specify systems
rigorously and to ensure the specification is correct and
consistent. In the area of computer security, formal meth-
ods provide a structured approach for modelling systems
using mathematical notations [7] that capture the security
policies, system properties, and underlying assumptions.
We propose using the Event-B formalism to capture
security policies of DIS.
Event-B is a formal method extended from B-Method
[1]. It is a state-based method that uses set theory as a main
distinctive attribute [6] to model systems for specification
and verification purposes. A system can be modelled
gradually to reflect its complexity by the use of abstraction
Fig. 1 SecureDIS architecture
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and refinement techniques. Event-B uses mathematical
proofs to ensure the correctness of each level and the
consistency between refinement levels [6].
An Event-B model consists of two main components:
CONTEXT and MACHINE. The CONTEXT includes the
static part of the model that defines SETS, CONSTANTS,
and AXIOMS to add constraints on the sets. The
MACHINE contains the dynamic part of the model that
includes VARIABLES, INVARIANTS, and EVENTS. The
VARIABLES specify the states of the system and can be
modified by guarded EVENTS. The INVARIANTS specify
the constraints on variables, which need to be proved true
at any state of the system. The verification of the model
demonstrates consistency by ensuring the correctness
among all refinements.
The integrated toolsets used to model Event-B is Rodin
[2]. The verification process achieved by Rodin includes:
(1) model checking: by ProB [20] model checker integrated
in Rodin and (2) theorem proving: by generating and
proving proof obligations.
3.2 Modelling Security Policies
The security policies modelled in this case study are
derived from the aforementioned system requirements in
Table 1 that are focused on CPT properties. A security
policy consists of the following basic components: a sub-
ject, permission(s), and an object [8], and targets a specific
property.
The security policies that satisfy the requirements in
Table 1 are modelled through Event-B refinements. Three
levels of refinements are proposed (see Fig. 2), where each
level is represented by aCONTEXT, namelyC0, C1, andC2:
1. System abstraction it captures the process of data
consumers querying the data provided by different data
sources in addition to the security policy that grants the
execution of the query. The policy grants the execution
only if the consumer is assigned to a specific role that
provides the permission to execute the query.
2. The first refinement it extends the security policy with
the purpose for which data items can be accessed in
addition to the data sensitivity.
3. The second refinement it extends the security policy
with the trust levels that data sources should place into
data consumers for granting them the query execution.
Table 1 System requirements details
Req. no. System requirement Property Type
1 Each data consumer must be assigned to a role to access data sources items C Specification
2 Each data source specifies which roles are allowed to access the sources data items C Specification
3 A data consumer is granted access to data items returned by a query if the assigned role is an allowed role C Enforcement
4 Each data consumer specifies a purpose to access data items P Specification
5 Each data item is associated with a purpose for which it was collected P Specification
6 A data consumer is granted access to data items returned by a query, if the purpose of the query matches the
purpose for which the data items were collected
P Enforcement
7 Each data item is classified based on its sensitivity P Specification
8 Each data consumer is assigned to a security level that specifies the authorisation to access data of a certain
sensitivity
P Enforcement
9 A data consumer is granted access to data items returned by a query, if the security level of the consumer is
equal to the sensitivity level of the data items
P Enforcement
10 Each data consumer is assigned to a trust level T Specification
11 Data sources determine the acceptable data consumers trust levels T Specification
12 A data consumer is granted access to data items returned by a query, if the trust level of the consumer
matches the accepted trust level of data items
T Enforcement
Fig. 2 Security policy refinements
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3.2.1 System Abstraction: Modelling Confidentiality
The first step is to model the data consumer queries to
different data sources and the RBAC policy governing
query execution granted to consumers. The system
abstraction includes four main sets: DATA_CONSUMER,
the set of data consumers; CONSUMER_ROLE, the set of
roles assigned to consumers; DATA_ITEM, the set of data
items associated with data sources and also returned by
queries; and DATA_SOURCE, the set of data sources
providing the data items to answer data consumers queries.
The system abstraction also includes the main VARI-
ABLES and EVENTS to capture the DIS environment, see
Fig. 3. The events are summarised as follows:
– AddDataSources to add data sources to the model.
– AddDataItemsToSources to create data items and
associate them to data sources.
– AddDataConsumers to add data consumers to themodel.
– AddRoles to add consumers’s roles to the model.
– AssignRolesToConsumers to assign consumer roles to
data consumers.
– AddConsumersQueries to create consumer queries
containing data items.
The variable belong_to is defined to associate data items
with their data sources, where multiple data items belong to
multiple data sources. The invariant that ensures this
relation is defined as follows:
inv1 : belong to 2 P1ðDATA ITEMÞ $ sources
Data consumers can access the data items coming from
data sources by creating a query. The variable query is
defined as the relationship between consumers and data
items. The following invariant shows that multiple con-
sumers can query multiple data items:
inv2 : query 2 consumers $ P1ðDATA ITEMÞ
However, the query has one main restriction that is
when a consumer (c) requests a set of data items (items),
these items need to belong to existing data sources (s). This
restriction is enforced by the following invariant:
inv3 : 8c; items:c 7! items 2 query
) ð9s:belong tofitemsg ¼ sÞ
Thequery is created in theAddConsumersQueriesevent shown
below. The event contains a list of parameters (ANY), a col-
lection of guards (WHERE), and collection of actions (THEN).
An event can execute its action(s) only when its guard(s) are
true. In this case, the event needs to essentially check whether
data items map to sources in grd4 to satisfy inv3.
EventAddConsumersQueries
ANY
consumer; data items; source
WHERE
grd1 :consumer 2 consumers
grd2 :ðdata items 2 P1ðDATA ITEMÞÞ^
ðdata items 6¼ ;Þ
grd3 :ðsource 2 sourcesÞ
grd4 :data items 7! source 2 belong to
THEN
act1 :query :¼ query[
fconsumer 7! data itemsg
END
To specify the security policy that captures the confiden-
tiality property, we model the following components:
– The assigned invariant to denote that a data consumer
can be assigned to more than one role, which fulfils sys.
req. 1, and that a role can be assigned to one or more
consumers, as follows:
inv4 : assigned 2 consumers $ roles
– The allowed invariant to indicate the roles allowed to
access the data items. Also, allowed ensures that data
items are actually coming from existing data sources
(sys. req. 2). Both these aspects are modelled as follows:
inv5 : allowed 2 roles $ P1ðDATA ITEMÞ
inv6 : 8role; items:role 7! items 2 allowed )
ð9source:items 7! source 2 belong toÞ
– The event AddAuthorisation to add the RBAC policy
to the system by updating the variable allowed. To add
Fig. 3 System abstraction:
modelling data query and
confidentiality
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the pair of a data item (i) and a role (r) to the allowed
access control list, the guard grd3 checks whether the






grd1 :i 2 P1ðDATA ITEMÞ
grd2 :ðs 2 sourcesÞ ^ ðsources 6¼ ;Þ
grd3 :i 7! s 2 belong to
grd4 :ðr 2 rolesÞ ^ ðroles 62 ;Þ
grd5 :r 7! i 62 allowed
THEN
act1 :allowed :¼ allowed [ fr 7! ig
END
To model the enforcement of the security policy specified
earlier, we include the following:
– inv7 to model the actual access of consumers to data
items and inv8 to ensure the accessed items are
returned by a query:
inv7 : access 2 consumers $ P1ðDATA ITEMÞ
inv8 : 8c; items:c 7! items 2 access
) ðc 7! items 2 queryÞ
– The AccessData event checks whether the consumer
is assigned to a role (grd3), and the assigned role is
entitled to execute the query (grd4), to fulfil sys.
req. 3. It also ensures the data items accessed by the
consumer are returned as result of a query by the







grd1 :consumer 2 consumers
grd2 :data items 2 query½fconsumerg
grd3 :ðconsumer roles  rolesÞ^
ðassigned½fconsumerg ¼ consumer rolesÞ
grd4 :9role:ðroles 2 consumer rolesÞ^
ðrole 7! data items 2 allowedÞ
grd5 :ðconsumer 7! data itemsÞ 62 access
THEN
act1 :access :¼ access [ fconsumer 7! data itemsg
END
3.2.2 First Refinement: Modelling Privacy
The system abstraction in Sect. 3.2.1 models who can have
access to the data items returned by a query. This refine-
ment extends the previous level by adding the purpose and
data sensitivity privacy dimensions to the security policy as
discussed in Sect. 2.1.
To model the purpose, we have introduced the following
components:
– A set DATA_USE_PURPOSE is defined in the context
(C1) to include the possible data use purposes assigned
to data consumers or data items:
axm1 : partitionðDATA USE PURPOSE;fresearchg;
fcommercialg;fpersonalg;fpublicgÞ
– The variable item_purpose is defined to represent the
relationship between the P1 (DATA_ITEM) and
DATA_USE_PURPOSE:
inv9 : item purpose 2 P1ðDATA ITEMÞ
$ DATA USE PURPOSE
– The variable query_purpose is defined to represent the
relationship between the consumers and DATA_USE_
PURPOSE:
inv10 : query purpose 2 consumers
! DATA USE PURPOSE
– A new event, AddItemsPurposes, to assign several
purposes to data items (sys. req. 5). The guards and
actions of the event AddItemsPurposes are as follows:
grd1 : purpose2DATA USE PURPOSE
grd2 : i 2P1ðDATA ITEMÞ
act1 : item purpose :¼ item purpose[fi 7!purposeg
– The event AddConsumersQueries is refined to assign a
purpose to each consumer request to query the system
(sys. req. 4) by adding the following:
grd1 : purpose 2 DATA USE PURPOSE
grd2 : c 2 consumers
act1 : query purpose :¼ query purpose [ fc 7! purposeg
To model the data classification, we include the following:
• A set named CLASSIFICATION is defined in the
context(C1) to contain the possible levels that can be
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assigned to data items and data consumers. The set
includes the following labels:
– Regulated data items that are protected by data
protection regulations. For example, the items that
contain the PII, such as names, SSN, and credit card
numbers. If these items were disclosed, harm is
caused to the reputation of the data sources and may
lead to financial losses.
– Confidential data items that include sensitive infor-
mation that when disclosed, it can result in a
medium level of harm and financial losses.
– Public data items that can be disclosed to the
general public that when disclosed, it results in a
low risk to privacy and reputation.
axm2 : partitionðCLASSIFICATION;fRegulatedg;
fConfidentialg;fPublicgÞ
• A variable classified is defined to link each data item
with a CLASSIFICATION (sys. req. 7) as follows:
inv11 : classified 2 P1ðDATA ITEMÞ
9CLASSIFICATION
• The event AddDataItemsToSource is refined to classify
each data item by updating the variable classified as
follows:
grd1 : i 2 P1ðDATA ITEMÞ
grd2 : j 2 CLASSIFICATION
grd3 : i 62 domðclassifiedÞ
act1 : classified :¼ classified [ fi 7! jg
• A variable security_clearance to associate a consumer
with the security clearance. It is defined as follows:
inv12 : security clearance 2 consumers
! CLASSIFICATION
• The event AddDataConsumers is refined to assign each
new data consumer an appropriate security clearance
(sys. req. 8):
grd1 : sc 2 CLASSIFICATION
grd2 : c 2 consumers
grd3 : c 7! sc 62 security clearance
act1 : security clearance :
¼ security clearance [ fc 7! scg
To enforce the extended security policy, we refined the
AccessData event by including the following guards:
• A guard to enforce accessing data when the data
consumer’s purpose, during query creation, matches
one of the data item purposes (sys. req. 6):
grd6 : item purpose½fdata itemsg
¼ query purpose½fconsumerg
• A guard to ensure that the classification of the data
items requested for access matches the consumer’s
security clearance (sys. req. 9):
grd7 : security clearance½fconsumerg
¼ classified½fdata itemsg
3.2.3 Second Refinement: Modelling Trust
The second refinement extends the first to capture the trust
property. Trust is introduced into the security policy to
minimise threats that are related to secondary disclosure of
information caused by data consumers abuse of privileges.
Therefore, in this refinement we introduce the trust model
proposed in [3]. This trust model labels an entity with any
of the following levels: very good, good, neutral, bad, and
very bad, based on calculations conducted on that entity to
assess its risks. This trust model is included in the second
refinement by adding the following components:
– A set TRUST_LEVEL containing all possible trust
levels in the trust model:
axm3 : partitionðTRUST LEVEL; fvery goodg;
fgoodg; fneutralg; fbadg; fvery badgÞ
– A variable consumer_tlevel to associate each data
consumer with its trust level:
inv13 :
consumer tlevel 2 consumers ! TRUST LEVEL
– A variable item_tlevel to associate data items with their
acceptable trust levels:
inv14 :
item tlevel 2 P1ðDATA ITEMÞ $ TRUST LEVEL
– The event AddConsumers is refined to associate a data
consumer with its trust level during the addition of the
consumer to the system (sys. req. 10):
grd5 : c 2 consumers
grd6 : t 2 TRUST LEVEL
act3 : consumer tlevel ¼ consumer tlevel [ fc 7! tg
– The event AddDataItemsToSources is refined to asso-
ciate data items with acceptable trust levels (sys. 487
req. 11):
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grd5 : i 2 P1ðDATA ITEMÞ
grd6 : t 2 TRUST LEVEL
act3 : item tlevel ¼ item tlevel [ fi 7! tg
To enforce the security policy related to the trust property,
we refined the AccessData event to check whether the
consumer’s trust level matches the expected trust level
associated with the data items returned by a query (sys.
req. 12). The following guard is included:
grd8 : item tlevel½fdata itemsg
¼ consumer tlevel½fconsumerg
4 Formal Verification of the Model
The Rodin toolset provides an environment for both modelling
and proving by theorem proving and model checking. In
addition to formal modelling, we also prove that the proposed
Event-B model is correct and consistent. Table 2 presents an
overview of the proof efforts provided by Rodin. These statis-
tics measure the proof obligations (PO) generated and dis-
charged by the Rodin prover and the POs that are interactively
proved. The complete development of theDIS security policies
results in38POs, inwhich (100 %)areprovedautomaticallyby
Rodin. The number of POs in the system abstraction that cap-
tures the confidentiality property is larger than other refine-
ments. This is due to establishing the main components of the
security policies (the subject, the permission(s), and the object),
and therefore many invariants are introduced in that layer to
guarantee the correctness of these components.
4.1 Theorem Proving
There are different POs generated by Rodin during the
development of a system [14]. As an example of a PO, we
demonstrate an ‘‘Invariant Preservation’’ PO here. The INV
PO ensures that each invariant is preserved by each event.
To prove that inv 6 , below, is preserved by AddAuthori-
sation event, ‘‘AddAuthorisation/inv6/INV’’ PO is gener-
ated and proved by Rodin.
inv6 : 8role; items:role 7! items 2 allowed )
ð9source:items 7! source 2 belong toÞ
To prove this PO, guard grd3 below is added to the
AddAuthorisation event to ensure that each role is linked to
a data item that actually belongs to a data source.
grd3 : i 7! s 2 belong to
4.2 Model Checking
ProB is an animator and model checker for Event-B. ProB
allows fully automatic exploration of Event-B models and
can be used to systematically check a specification for a
range of errors. We analysed our model using ProB to
ensure that the model is deadlock free. For each new event
added in the refinements, we have verified that it would not
introduce a deadlock using ProB.
5 Related Work
The work presented in this paper is related to two main
areas of research: security and privacy engineering and
formal analysis of security policies.
5.1 Security and Privacy Engineering
This area of research focuses on considering security and
privacy threats in the early phases of the software devel-
opment lifecycle. Two of the popular techniques that help
system designers in identifying security and privacy threats
are Microsoft’s STRIDE [25] and LINDDUN [9]. STRIDE
provides a taxonomy of the type of threats. It is the acro-
nym of: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information
Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege.
Each of these categories of threats negates a security
property, namely confidentiality, integrity, availability,
authentication, authorisation, and non-repudiation.
STRIDE guides the system designers on the identification
of security threats through a systematic process. First, a
model of the system is created and the system components
are mapped to the six threat categories. Then, a catalogue
of threat tree patterns is used to identify specific instances
of threat categories, where the level of risk of each threat is
determined. Finally, the risk of the threat is reduced or
eliminated by introducing proper countermeasures and
defences.
LINDDUN follows a process similar to STRIDE to help
system designers in identifying privacy rather than security
threats. Similar to STRIDE, LINDDUN provides a taxon-
omy of privacy threats that violate specific privacy prop-
erties. It includes an extensive catalogue of specific threats.
For each category of threats, a list of privacy-enhancing
technologies that mitigate privacy threats are provided.
Table 2 The statistics of the model
Element name Total Auto Manual
Model 38 38 0
Confidentiality 25 25 0
Privacy 9 9 0
Trust 4 4 0
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Similar to STRIDE and LINDDUN, SecureDIS frame-
work aims to help designer in identifying threats early in
the software development lifecycle. However, SecureDIS
focuses only on a specific category of threats, namely data
leakage threats, and a specific type of systems, namely DIS.
5.2 Formal Analysis of Security Policies
This area of research focuses on automated methods and
tools to detect and correct errors in policy specifications
before they are deployed. Several approaches have been
proposed to analyse security policies, which mainly differ
in the formalism and tools used to model and analyse the
policies. These approaches pursue different techniques,
ranging from SMT formulae to Multi-Terminal Binary
Decision Diagrams (MTBDD) and different kinds of
logics.
Margrave [11] uses MTBDDs as the underlying repre-
sentation of XACML policies. It supports two main types
of policy analysis: policy querying, which analyses access
requests evaluated to a certain decision, and change-impact
analysis, which is used to compare policies. However,
BDD-based approaches allow the analysis of policies only
against a limited range of properties.
Alternative approaches encode policies and properties as
propositional formulas and analyse them using SAT solvers
[16]. However, SAT solvers cannot handle Boolean vari-
ables and therefore are limited in the type of access control
policies that can be modelled and analysed.
Other formalisms have also been used for the analysis of
access control policies. Description logic (DL) [18] is used
to formalise access control policies and employs off-the-
shelf DL reasoners for policy analysis. The use of DL
reasoners allows modelling more expressive access control
policies, but it suffers from scalability issues.
Answer Set Programming (ASP) [10] has also being
used to model and analyse access control policies, but it
also has some limitations. ASP does not support quantifiers
and does not easily allow the expression of constraints,
such as Linear Arithmetic.
More recent approaches to policy analysis are based on
SMT [26]. The use of SMT does not only enable wider
coverage of access control policies compared to the anal-
ysis tools mentioned above but also improves the
performance.
Similar to our work, other works have applied Event-B
to model and analyse access control policies [6, 15]. One of
the main advantages of using Event-B to model and anal-
yse security policies is that it is possible to model not only
the access control policies but also the system where the
policies are going to be deployed. Another advantage is the
expressiveness of the Event-B formalism that allows
modelling fine-grained policies. Last, but not least, the
Rodin tool that supports the Event-B formalism allows
Java code generation from the formal model of the system
and its policies.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
SecureDIS is a framework that helps system designers to
mitigate data leakage threats during the early phases of the
DIS development. SecureDIS provides designers with a set
of informal guidelines written in natural language to
specify and enforce security policies that capture Confi-
dentiality, Privacy, and Trust (CPT) properties.
In this paper, we applied a formal approach to model the
SecureDIS system and its security policies and verify the
correctness and consistency of the model. We used Event-
B formal method to formalise the requirements on the
specific policy elements that satisfy the CPT properties.
These elements were gradually built throughout the model
by utilising Event-B abstraction and refinements.
Modelling security policies that capture the SecureDIS
main properties is useful to demonstrate how access to data
can be controlled by several conditions, as explained in
Sect. 3: the allowed role specified as invariant 5 and 6, the
allowed purpose specified as guard 6 of the AccessData
Event, and the allowed trust level specified as guard 7 of the
AccessData Event. This helps in mitigating the threats of
data leakage by minimising data exposure due to the incor-
rect specification of the security policies, such as unautho-
rised access, non-compliance to security policy, and the
misuse of data by authorised consumers.
We are planning to extend this work in several directions.
A first direction is to model an instance of a real DIS along
with its security policies and check the correctness of those
policies before deployment. Another direction is to use the
correct model of the security policies to automatically gen-
erate the code for their enforcement using the Rodin tool.
Acknowledgments The work reported in this paper is funded by
King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creative
commons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distri-
bution, and reproduction in anymedium, provided you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
1. Abrial JR (2010) Modeling in Event-B: system and software
engineering. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
2. Abrial JR, Butler M, Hallerstede S, Voisin L (2006) An open
extensible tool environment for Event-B. Formal methods and
software engineering. Lect Notes Comput Sci 4260:588–605
Formal Modelling of Data Integration Systems Security Policies 147
123
3. Agudo I, Fernandez-Gago C, Lopez J (2010) A scale based trust
model for multi-context environments. Comput Math Appl
60(2):209–216
4. Akeel F, Wills G, Gravell A (2013) SecureDIS: a framework for
secure data integration systems. In: The 8th international con-
ference for internet technology and secured transactions,
pp 588–593
5. Akeel FY, Wills GB, Gravell AM (2014) Exposing data leakage
in Data Integration Systems. In: 9th International conference for
internet technology and secured transactions, ICITST 2014,
pp 420–425
6. Butler M (2013) Mastering system analysis and design through
abstraction and refinement. In: Broy M, Peled D, Kalus G (eds)
Engineering dependable software systems. IOS Press, pp 49–78
7. Butler MJ, Leuschel M, Presti SL, Turner P (2004) The use of
formal methods in the analysis of trust (position paper). Trust
Manag Lect Notes Comput Sci 2995:333–339
8. Crampton J, Huth M (2010) Towards an access-control frame-
work for countering insider threats. Adv Inf Secur 49:173–195
9. Deng M, Wuyts K, Scandariato R, Preneel B, Joosen W (2011) A
privacy threat analysis framework: supporting the elicitation and
fulfillment of privacy requirements. Requir Eng 16(1):3–32
10. Ramli CDPK, Nielson HR, Nielson F (2013) XACML 3.0 in
Answer Set Programming. In: Logic-based program synthesis and
transformation. Springer, Berlin, pp 89–105
11. Fisler K, Krishnamurthi S, Meyerovich LA, Tschantz MC (2005)
Verification and change-impact analysis of access-control poli-
cies. In: Proceedings of the 27th international conference on
software engineering, pp 196–205
12. Gollmann D (1999) Computer security. Wiley, New York
13. Guarda P, Zannone N (2009) Towards the development of pri-
vacy-aware systems. Inf Softw Technol 51(2):337–350
14. Hallerstede S (2011) On the purpose of Event-B proof obliga-
tions. Form Asp Comput 23(1):133–150
15. Hoang TS, Basin D, Abrial JR (2009) Specifying access control
in Event-B. Technical report, vol 624
16. Hughes G, Bultan T (2008) Automated verification of access
control policies using a SAT solver. Int J Softw Tools Technol
Transf 10(6):503–520
17. ISO: ISO/IEC27000 (2014) Information technology: security
techniques: information security management systems: overview
and vocabulary
18. Kolovski V, Hendler J, Parsia B (2007) Analyzing web access
control policies. In: Proceedings of the 16th international con-
ference on World Wide Web—WWW ’07, p 677
19. Lenzerini M (2002) Data integration: a theoretical perspective.
In: Proceedings of the 21st ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART
symposium on principles of database systems. Madison, Wis-
consin, USA, pp 233–246
20. Leuschel M, Butler M (2003) The ProB animator and model
checker for B - A tool description. Int Symp Form Methods Eur
2805:855–874
21. McCallister E, Grance T, Scarfone K (2010) Guide to protect the
confidentiality of personal identifiable information (PII). NIST
Special Publication (800-122), p 59
22. Nachouki G, Quafafou M (2011) MashUp web data sources and
services based on semantic queries. Inf Syst 36(2):151–173
23. Paci F, Fernandez-Gago C, Moyano F (2013) Detecting insider
threats: a trust-aware framework. In: 2013 Eighth international
conference on availability, reliability and security (ARES),
pp 121–130
24. Ross R, Oren JC, Mcevilley M (2014) Systems security engi-
neering an integrated approach to building trustworthy resilient
systems. NIST Special Publication (800-160), p 121
25. Torr P (2005) Demystifying the threat modeling process. IEEE
Secur Priv 3(5):66–70
26. Turkmen F, Den Hartog J, Ranise S, Zannone N (2015) Analysis
of XACML policies with SMT. Lecture notes in computer sci-
ence (including subseries lecture notes in artificial intelligence
and lecture notes in bioinformatics), vol 9036, pp 115–134
27. Westin A (1970) Privacy and freedom. Bodley Head, London
148 F. Akeel et al.
123
